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THE MISCHARACTERIZED ASYLUM CRISIS:

REALITIES BEHIND PROPOSED REFORMS
Deborah Anker
The Clinton Administration recently announced proposals for regulatory reform of United States asylum policy.' These proposals maintain the
basic structure of the current system which includes: (1) an informal
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) adjudication before an
asylum officer for applicants who are not in deportation or exclusion
proceedings; and (2) a formal Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR) evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge 2 A major proposed rule change is that asylum officers will only grant cases and will
refer all others to immigration judges for a full evidentiary hearing.3 In
addition to these proposed regulatory reforms, there are various legislative proposals including a bill, introduced by Congressman Mazzoli, that
would eliminate immigration judges altogether and provide asylum appli* Lecturer in Law, Coordinator and clinical Instructor, Harvard Law School,
Immigration and refugee Program. B.A., Brandeis University; M.A.T., Harvard University; J.D. Northeastern University School of Law; LL.M. Harvard Law School. The
Ford Foundation provided support for both of the Harvard studies cited in this article.
As always, the author and the Immigration and Refugee Program owe special thanks
to Professor Gary Bellow of the Harvard Law School, Faculty Director of Clinical
Programs, for his leadership and inspiration.
1. See Sarah Ignatius, Restricting The Rights of Asylum Seekers: The New Legislative and Administrative Proposals, 7 HARV. HUm. RTS. J. 225 (1994) (providing a
comprehensive review of these and other asylum reform proposals).
2. INS No. 1651-93: Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for
Asylum and Withholding of Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed.
Reg. 61, 14,779 (1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208); INS Drafts Asylum Reform Regulations, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 185 (1994) [hereinafter INS Asylum
Reform Proposals]. The Justice Department created the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) in 1983 as a separate agency from the INS. See generally T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF AND DAVID E. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION; PROCESS AND POLICY

638-43 (2d ed. 1994) (providing a detailed description of EOIR procedures); DEBORAH
E. ANKER, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW FOUNDATION, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES,

22-60 (2d ed. 1991) (same).

3. 59 Fed. Reg. 61, 14,779, 14,786-87 (1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
208.14(b)) (proposed March 30, 1994).
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cants with a single interview before an asylum officer without a right to
an evidentiary hearing or a decision by an independent adjudicator
There also are several legislative proposals for summary exclusion.'
These provide expedited preliminary screening hearings for certain asylum applicants using a legal standard different from the asylum standard,
informal interviews by an INS officer, review by another officer but
with no evidentiary hearing and severe limitations on most forms of
judicial review. Other proposals have suggested the creation of a new
type of hearing officer and a change in the standard of proof for asylum.6 The strong perc6ption that the existing asylum system is too generous, and that fraudulent claims discredit and overwhelm it, motivates
these reforms. Recent media reports fostered this perception and had a
significant impact on mobilizing public opinion in favor of reform initiatives.7
A study that our immigration and refugee program at Harvard Law
School completed a few months ago presents data that challenges these
perceptions. The results of this study are contained in a report by Sarah
Ignatius.8 The two-year report was the first comprehensive non-governmental study of the implementation of the 1990 asylum reforms. Among
other changes, the 1990 reforms replaced INS examiners working under
the jurisdiction of the local district directors with full-time trained asylum officers who are responsible to the Central INS Asylum Office. The

4. H.R. 3363, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
5. S. 1333, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2836, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 3860, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994). Congressman Mazzoli's bill also contains summary exclusion provisions. See H.R. 3363, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993)
(pertaining to asylum applicants who arrive without documents or with fraudulent
documents). INS officers would screen applicants to determine if they had a "credible
fear of persecution" before permitting them to apply for asylum through regular channels. Id.; see also Ignatius, supra note 1, at 236-37 (discussing the uses of the credible fear standard and various reports criticizing the past use of the standard).
6. H.R. 1679, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
7. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: How Did He Get Here? (CBS television broadcast,
Mar. 14, 1993, reprinted in Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearings on H.R. 1153,
H.R. 1355, and H.R. 1679 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103 Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1993)).
8.

SARAH IGNATIUS, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PRO-

GRAM, NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT]. Copies of this report are available

by writing to Harvard Law School Immigration and Refugee Program, Pound Hall
511, Cambridge MA. 02138.
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Study analyzed 1,331 cases that a total of 151 asylum officers adjudicated in all seven of the asylum regions; these cases included asylum applicants from 60 countries.9 The Study contained analyses of 880 notices of intent to deny or preliminary assessments to grant asylum, including 477 received from attorneys and 403 that the INS provided for review.' The Study concluded that the asylum officer corps was a significant improvement over the past system of INS adjudication, with
substantial management and related problems attributable, in large part,
to a failure to fund and otherwise resource the program at an appropriate level." Overall, the assessment and recommendations on management and administration were similar to those of a Department of Justice report, released contemporaneously.' 2
I want to discuss some of the Study's findings that relate to the possible existence of an asylum crisis, as promoted and described in the
media. First-and this is based on publicly available statistics-asylum
applicants arriving in the United States primarily come from refugeeproducing countries. The Study compiled stiitistics after the first eleven
months of 1993 and out of approximately 133,000 asylum applicants,
seventy percent came from ten countries: Bangladesh, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and the Philippines. 3 In each of these countries except Mexico, human rights organizations documented widespread human rights abuses that produced
refugee flows. As the report notes, in Mexico these same human rights
organizations have documented targeted persecution."'
Second, there was a relatively low no-show rate-only sixteen percent-for applicants at INS asylum interviews.' As the final report
notes, what is quite remarkable is that this appearance rate of eightyfour percent existed despite computer problems that in many cases resulted in "no notice at all of asylum interviews, notice only to the applicant and not his or her attorney, or notice only two or three days before

9. Id. at vi.
10. Id.
11. NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT supra note 8. at 3.
12. Management and Planning Staff, Justice Management Division, Management
Review of the INS Affirmative Asylum Processing System (Dept. of Justice, Sept.
1993) (on file with The American University Journal of International Lass, and Policy); see 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Oct. 18, 1993, at 1364 (providing a report on the

two studies).
13. NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT. supra note 8. at 3.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 4-5 (referring to the first eleven months of FY 1993).
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the interview."' 6 For example, the Newark asylum office, "the office
with the highest no-show rate was also the office with the allegations of
the most computer errors in the INS database." 7
Third, much of the present crisis is the result of inefficiency, mismanagement, unfairness, and discrimination attributable to the INS. Thus, of
the over 318,000 cases in the backlog at the end of the study period,
the previous system left 114,000 cases undecided. 8 Another 50,000
were Salvadoran and Guatemalan claims that the Bush administration,
under a settlement agreement in American Baptist Churches v.
Thornburgh,9 agreed had to be re-adjudicated because of discrimination
against those groups under the pre-1990 INS district director asylum
system.20
Fourth, as noted above, the overall assessment of the asylum officer
corps was of a "substantially more professional, informed, and impartial
body of asylum decision-makers" than the pre-1990 INS examiners."
Asylum officers generally were successful at eliciting the applicant's
claim and at conducting the interviews in a non-adversarial manner.22
The Study identified serious legal errors and substantial unevenness in
the quality of decision making.' Despite these and other problems,
however, the Study found that the asylum officer corps was moving in
the direction of improved adjudication. Most of our recommendations
related to better management, improved resources, training, and hiring
criteria. Although there are several important matters with which we
disagree,' many of our recommendations are consistent with the regu-

16. Id.
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id.
19. 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see Carolyn Patty Blum, The Settlement
of American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh: Landmark Victory for Central American
Asylum-Seekers, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 347 (1991).
20. NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
21. Id. at 1.
22. See id. (stating that "[ijn almost 70% of the asylum interviews studied, asylum officers elicited the claim of the applicant at the interview and conducted the
interview in a non-adversarial manner").
23. Id. at 1, 93-94.
24. For example, we disagree with the proposed elimination of Notices of Intent
to Deny (NOIDS). We found that rebuttals to NOIDs serve an important corrective
role, particularly given the significant incidence of fundamental legal errors in asylum
officer decision making. Id. at 117. In addition, the Study recommended interviews
and adjudication of applications for work authorization within 90 days of filing. The
Administration's proposals do not require the granting of work authorization before
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latory reforms proposed by the Clinton administration which maintain
the present structure of asylum officer and immigration judge adjudica-

tion with additional resources for improved management and quality of
decision making. The Study strongly recommended the implementation
of these changes rather than "a drastic overhaul of the process or the
design of another new administrative structure, which would create additional expense and delay in case adjudication."'

Fifth, many of the problems the Study identified are systemic and are
inherent to the nature of the asylum officer corps program. The asylum

officer interview is an informal adjudication. Applicants are not afforded
basic due process protection guaranteed in immigration court. This includes the right to present and cross-examine witnesses and the right to
a court-appointed interpreter.' There is no meaningful role allowed for
the asylum applicant's counsel and no record of the proceedings. There-

fore, there is no possibility for accountability in the form of administrative or judicial review." We do not believe this type of process can be
180 days after filing. INS Asylum Reform Proposals, supra note 2. See generally
JEANNE BUTTERFIELD, ET. AL, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAvYERs ASSOCIATION, COMNmmS, INS No. 1651-93: RuLEs AND PROCEDURES FOR ADJUDICATION OF APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM OR WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION AND FOR EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION (1994) (on file with The American University Journal of International
Law and Policy) (providing a comprehensive comment on the proposed rules).
25. NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 2. The

present asylum system was never financed or staffed correctly. The asylum office initially asked for a corps of 265 officers and received funding for only 82 positions; a
year later the number of officers increased by 68 officers to reach a total of 150.
The administration proposes to seek funding for 150 more officers, so that after three
years the program will have approximately the number of officers it needed at its
at 41. With both the backlog and current receipts increasing, this numinception. ld.
ber will be barely adequate when, and if, the positions are funded and allocated. See

Roberto Sum, An Abundance of Asylum Seekers: Overhaul Could Leave I Million
Immigrants Stuck in Backlog, VASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1994, at Al. As the National
Asylum Study Project report points out "[clompared with other countries, the United
States has fewer asylum adjudicators and staff proportionately for its case load." NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 60.

26. See Deborah Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatoy Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 442 (1992) (discussing proceedings before immigration judges).

27. See, In re

-,

(BIA March 7, 1991) (unpublished decision), in DEBORAH

ANKER, AmERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW FOUNDATION, 3 LAw OF ASYLUM IN THE
UNrrED STATES: ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS AND ANALYSIS 102 (3d ed. 1994) (noting the difficulty the Board of Immigration Appeals has confronted in reviewing asylum officer decisions is due, in part, to the lack of an adequate record). Compare
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the sole means of determining asylum claims. The Study, therefore, recommended maintaining the right to a hearing before an immigration
judge allowed under the current system.
We believe that accountability must continue to be built into asylum
adjudication. The asylum and immigration administrative systems have
suffered, both from the perspectives of fairness and efficiency, from a
lack of accountability. For those who care about improving the administration of our immigration laws, it is critical that immigration officials
be given less, not more, unreviewable power and discretion. Moreover,
the asylum system must not only be expeditious, but also must be perceived as credible. Studies of the current and prior systems reveal decision-making processes that have not always produced consistent and
substantively fair outcomes. As noted, the Study found problems in the
quality and independence of decision making among the current asylum
officer corps. 8 A 1987 Government Accounting Office study, that in-

JERRY L. MASHAW, BuREAucRATIC JUSTICE (1983) (arguing that judicial review may

not always be the most effective way to insure fairness and efficiency in administrative agencies and that internal accountability through supervisory review and other
mechanisms may sometimes be more effective) with NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 116 (noting an insufficient number of supervisors, the lack of appropriate hiring criteria for supervisors, insufficient time spent conducting review of asylum decisions, and the small percentage of cases reviewed by
the quality assurance branch of the central office). Our study was not reassuring about
internal mechanisms as a substitute for judicial review and other non-agency oversight,
such as applicants' attorneys' responses to notices of intent to deny. Supra note 24.
See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial
Review, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1205, 1215 (1989) (discussing the role of judicial review
in asylum adjudication).
28. Asylum officers are instructed to reach decisions on individual cases independent from foreign policy considerations. ASYLUM BRANCH & OFFICE OF THE GENERAL
COUNSEL, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE BASIC LAW MANUAL: ASYLUM, A TRAINING MANUAL FOR IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OFFICERS, REFUGEE LAW AND PRACTICE, A REFERENCE OF PERSPECTIVES AND PARAMETERS ON SE-

LECTED LEGAL ISSUES 8 (1991). Further, INS regulations acknowledge the usefulness
of non-governmental sources in evaluating conditions in the country of origin. 8
C.F.R. § 208.12(a) (1994). INS developed these guidelines in response to criticism
from many quarters that asylum adjudicators were inappropriately influenced by foreign policy and ideological considerations. Anker, supra note 26, at n.71-74. Nonetheless, the Study found that asylum officers continued to rely on State Department
materials in assessing a well-founded fear of persecution in 80% of the cases studied
and used credible non-governmental sources only on a limited basis. NATIONAL ASYLUM STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT supra note 8, at 8, 123-39. In both these respects, however, asylum officers' decisions demonstrated an improvement over time.
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cluded cases decided by the INS under the pre-1990 system as well as
those decided by immigration judges, found that adjudicators evaluated
the claims alleging the most serious forms of persecution differently and
that the outcomes varied according to the applicant's nationality."
Another case study of an immigration court conducted by our program at Harvard found that the court granted only ten percent of the
apparently strongest cases' and that the immigration court system was
seriously compromised by a lack of formal procedures, ad-hoc determinations, lack of independence of judgment, over-reliance on the State
Department, lack of criteria for establishing precedents at the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and other significant inefficiencies. 3 The immigration court study found that these inefficiencies were largely the responsibility of INS trial attorneys refusing to concede meritorious cases
and of immigration judges making inappropriate scheduling decisions,
routinely allowing only an hour or two for a hearing which led to continuances for a complete hearing on a claim.3 2 The EOIR's difficulty in
producing transcripts for appeals was the most significant cause of delay
in the process. The unavailability of these transcripts resulted in delays
averaging twenty-two months after the immigration judge rendered a
decision. 3 In addition, the Board of Immigration Appeals required, in
most cases, two to three years, and sometimes longer, to issue decisions
after attorneys for the applicants submitted briefs.' Clearly, if we are
to continue hearings by immigration judges, that system itself needs substantial improvement such as training for judges and rules that require
the Board of Immigration Appeals to make its decision-making processes
open and principled.

29. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTiNG OFFCE., ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLiCATIO, OF
STANDARDs UNCERTAIN-FEw DENIED APPLICANTS DEPORTED 22, 23 (1987) (stating

that "Applicants from different countries who claimed to have suffered similar mistreatment did not have similar approval rates. Worldwide . . . [of] . . . applicants
who claimed they were arrested, imprisoned, had their life threatened, or were tortured, we found an approval rate of 19%. Of these aliens, applicants from El Salvador and Nicaragua had a much lower approval rate than applicants from Poland and
Iran"). The report also noted agreement between the INS decision and the Department
of State advisory opinion in 96% of the cases. Id.
30. Anker, supra note 26, at 452-454.
31. Id. at 455-457, The Board of Immigration Appeals is the administrative
appellate body within the EOIR that has jurisdiction over appeals from immigration
judge decisions in deportation and exclusion proceedings. Supra note 2.
32. Id at 456.
33. Id at 457.
34. Id

36
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It is particularly significant that both the Harvard asylum officer corps
and immigration court studies found that many, indeed most, delays are
attributable not to the applicant but to the agency, either because of
poor, unmonitored judgments or insufficient resources.35 If we embark
on a course-one which I fear is implicit in many of the legislative
proposals as well as in some aspects of the administration's regulatory
proposals 36-- of giving INS more unreviewable power and discretion,
we will exacerbate these management problems as well as create an
alarming precedent for arbitrary governmental conduct. The positive
changes in the asylum system over the last fifteen years-beginning
with the advocacy for the Refugee Act of 1980-are the result of outside voices and scrutiny by the public, the non-governmental and academic communities, as well as by the federal judiciary.37 Many of the
best features of the current INS process-indeed, the very endeavor to
create a quasi-independent and professional asylum officer corps-are
the results of this independent examination and advocacy.38 The establishment of the Resource Information Center,39 the provision in the reg35. See id. at 456 (noting that less than one percent of the continuances granted
were attributable to the applicants failure to appear); see also NATIONAL ASYLUM
STUDY PROJECT FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 4-5, 45-48 (finding a relatively low
overall non-appearance rate of 16% and an unusually high non-appearance rate of
33% at the Newark asylum office, where there were the most computer errors in
entering applicant names into the database so that they could receive timely notice).
36. See supra note 24 (discussing the elimination of notices of intent to deny
(NOIDS)).
37. See generally The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MicH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUDIES 91; Deborah E. Anker and Michael H. Posner, The Forty
Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 9 (1981) (discussing the history of the Refugee Act of 1980).
38. INS proposed regulations in 1987 that would have created asylum officers not
as a separate corps, but as part of the normal INS district director structure. These
regulations would have eliminated immigration judges from any role in asylum adjudication. The regulations were defeated by a coalition of advocacy organizations which
protested that immigration judge hearings were necessary to ensure protection of basic
due process rights. See Asylum Plan is Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES October 27, 1987
at A18; Zita Arocha, Political Asylum Revision Dropped; Immigration Judges to Retain Appeals Role at the INS, WASH. POST, October 27, 1987 at A23 (discussing the
Reagan Administration's proposal to have the Justice Department rule on asylum
applications and the Administration's subsequent back-down from the proposal in the
face of opposition from attorneys and immigrant advocacy groups). Many of these
same groups worked closely with the Justice Department in establishing a consensus
for the 1990 reforms, which retained the immigration judges and established a professional and quasi-independent corps of asylum officers.
39. See David A Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the
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ulations permitting proof based on the treatment of similarly situated
persons,' and the instructions on evaluating credibility in light of infor-

mation on human rights conditions in the country of origin'

are at-

tributable to advocacy efforts or judicial review. We have a choice to
respond to a mischaracterized crisis and turn back the clock, or to con-

tinue the process begun over the last fifteen years of the "transformation" of immigration law, that is, making the practice of immigration
agencies consonant with salient norms of administrative law and constitutional due process,' 2 and making agency adjudicatory and decision-

Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1247, 1342-44 (1990) (recommending the establishment of a documentation resource center independent of the State Department).
Professor Martin's article is based on his report to the Administrative Conference of
the United States that issued recommendations including the creation of such a center.
54 Fed. Reg. 28,964, 28,970-72 (1989) (codified at I C.F.R § 305.89A (1990)). See
also Anker, supra note 26, at 462 (recommending the establishment of a non-governmental documentation center).
40. 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(2)(i) (1994). Before the reforms, numerous courts had
suggested that evidence of persecution of those similarly situated constituted proof of
the seriousness of the risk to the applicant. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS. 767 F.2d
1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing evidence of persecution of applicant's friends, who,
like he, had refused to join guerrillas, and newspaper articles showing violent consequences for those who refuse to join political guerrilla groups); Mendoza-Perez v.
INS, 902 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding proof of danger to applicant where
testimony showed others who worked for his organization were killed). In contrast
were "years of BIA decisions emphasizing 'singling out' and 'individual targeting'"
until the promulgation of the regulation. Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 1994),
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 19671. Actually, the Board of Immigration Appeals had begun
to recognize this principle in 1987 after the Supreme Court in INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450 (1987) overruled the agency for imposing an improperly
demanding standard of proof on asylum applicants. See Matter of Mogharrabhi, 19
I&N Dec. 734 (BIA 1988).
41. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13. This regulation is based on principles first articulated by
the Ninth Circuit. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d at 1284-1285 (9th Cir.
1984) (overruling the BIA and noting the relevance of the applicant's "general evidence, newspaper articles that demonstrate the political and social turmoil in El Salvador...."). See generally Carolyn Patty Blum, The Ninth Circuit and the Protection
of Asylum Seekers Since the Passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN DIEGO L
REv. 327 (1986) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the role of the Federal
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in reviewing Board asylum decisions); Deborah
Anker and Carolyn Blum, New Trends in Asylum Jurisprudence: The Aftermath of the
U.S. Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, I INT'L J. REFUGEE L 252
(1990) (same).
42. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Lam, 84 COLm. L
REV. 1 (1984) (describing the role of the federal judiciary and other forces in transforming immigration law from its past where it was "radically insulated" from fun-

38
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making processes accessible, principled and accountable.

damental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role to a
new structure more consonant with these principles).

